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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-RIGHT OF AGENT TO AIVE STATUTE OF LIMITAT!ONs-EsTOPPEL-Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. Defendant's insurance adjuster informed the father of the plaintiff that no settlement could be made of her claim for personal injuries until she had fully recovered, and represented to him that defendant company would pay all her damages
if the plaintiff did not consult an attorney. Held) where adjuster, having apparent authority to promise a settlement, lulled plaintiff into a false sense of security
and caused her to permit Massachusetts one year statute of limitations 1 to run,
defendant was estopped by the conduct of the adjuster from pleading the statute
as a defense to plaintiff's action for personal injuries. Bergeron v. Mansour,

(C.C.A. 1st, 1945) 152 F.-(2d) 27.
This case raises the question of the right of an agent to waive the statute of
limitations. If he has been expressly granted the authority to, waive or to do
some act constituting waiver, his right to waive the statute is indisputable. 2
Where this express authority is lacking, the apparent authorio/ vested in the
agent may so enlarge his actual authority that -he may exercise this right,3 the

Mass. Gen. Laws ( I 93 2) C. 260, § 4.
Watts v. Devor, l Grant (Pa. S.. Ct.) 267 (1855); l AGENCY RESTATEMENT
§ 17 (1933). Promise to waive the statute of limitations need not be in writing, 130
A.L.R. 8 at 26 (1941). Acknowledgement of an indebtedness by an agent who is the
proper person from whom to demand payment will take the case out of the statute of
limitations. Burt v. Palmer, 5 Esp. 145, 170 Eng. Rep. 766 (1804). Part payment
by agent will have the same effect. McAbee v. Wiley, 92 Ark. 245, 122 S.W. 623
( 1909). However, a general or special authority or a former course of dealing by
the agent from which the existence of such authority might have been inferred, is
necessary. Beal & Simons v. Adams Exp. Co., 13 Pa. Super Ct. 143 (1900).
3 MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY, 2d ed. § 236 (1903). Generally, no officer
1

2
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, theory being that the principal, by holding the agent out to the world as apparently possessed of this authority, is estopped to deny it. 4 This power in the
agent has been held to exist where he is a corporate o.fficer,5 b_usiness manager/
or claim agent.7 The apparent authority of the agent to promise a settlem~nt
may constitute a proper foundation on which to predicate an apparent authority
to waive the statute. 8 In such a case, assuring the plaintiff that the statutory limitation would not be interposed, 9 representing that defendant was going to settle
for injuries coupled with a request not to sue, 10 or inducing plaintiff to withdraw
suit 11 have been held sufficient grounds for estoppel. Estoppel is equally applica- ble whether the action be ex delicto or ex contractu. 12 Certainly the invocation
of this equitable doctrine, as in the instant case, is justified where an innocent
person has relied on the statements of the agent, who had apparent authority to
waive the statute, and has been letl reasonably to believe that the statute w<luld
not be pleaded.18
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or agency of the state has a right to waive the defense of the statute of limitations.
Nagel v. Department of Labor and Industries, 189 Wash. 631, 66 P. (2d) 318 (1937).
But, misleading conduct may estop governmental agencies from pleading the statute.
Hubbell v. City of South Hutchinson, 64 Kan. 645, 68 P. 52 (1902). Where there
is a contractual limitation of time within which an action may be brought against a
liability insurer, a situation somewhat analogous to that in the instant case, it has been
held that the conduct of an agent may be such as to waive the limitation clause, or to
estop his principal from setting it ~Pas a bar. 83 A.L.R. 748 at 764 (1933), 2CouCH>
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW, 554 (1929).
"Johnston v. Milwaukee & Wyo. Inv. Co., 46 Neb. 480, 64 N.W. 1100 (1895).
11
Holman v. Omaha & C. B. Ry. & Bridge Co., 117 Iowa 268, 90 N.W. 833
(1902).
6
Palethorp v. Furnish, 2 Esp. 5u, note, 170 Eng. Rep. 437 (1783).
7 See the principal case.
8
Ibid. Reasonable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is an essential element of
estoppel. 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, § 71, p. 267 (1942). Note that the conduct justifying an
estoppel must occur before the statutory bar has run. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Davis,
186 Ark. 401, 53 S.W. (2d) 851 (1932); 130 A.L.R. 8 at 18 (1941).
9
Holman v. Omaha & C.B. Ry. & Bridge Co., II7 Iowa 268, 90 N.W. 833
(1902).
1
° Clover Splint Coal Co. v. Lorenz, 270 Ky. 67~, II0 S.W. (2d) 457 (1937).
But a mere request not to sue or a request for delay in bringing suit is not in itself a
ground for estoppel. 34 AM. JUR., Limitations of Actions, § 419, p. 3 3 I.
The converse of the proposition is also true. Representations made to an agent, thus
inducing the principal to refrain from commencing an action until the action has been
barred by the statute of limitations will estop the person making said representations
from setting up the statute as a bar. Baker-Matthews Mfg. Co. v. Grayling Lumber
Co., 134 Ark. 351, 203 S.W. 1021 (1918).
11
McLearn v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617 (1931).
12
McCampbell v. Southard, 62 Ohio App. 339, 23 N.E. (2d) 954 (1937); 77
A.L.R. 1044 (1932).
18
Howard v. West Jersey & Seashore R.R. Co., 102 N.J. Eq. 517, 141 A. 755
( 1928). In general, see Dawson, "Estoppel and Statutes of Limitation," 34 MxcH. L.
REV. l (1935).
The agency itself may be contemplated as a dangerous instrumentality. 42 HARV.
L. REV. 685 (1929).

